Chapter 2 – The Hierarchy of Laws and Conflict Resolution | The Ultimate Professional Treatise
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Chapter 2: The Hierarchy of Laws and Conflict Resolution
From Constitutional Supremacy to Stare Decisis
By Afzal Hosen Mandal, Legal Advisor & Digital Law Specialist, Afzal & Associates
Published: 02 May 2026 | Updated: 02 May 2026 | Reading Time: 52 min | Word Count: ~9,400
📑 Table of Contents
- The Constitutional Supremacy Clause (Article 7)
- Relationship Between Central Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules
- Delegated Legislation: Sub‑Registry Rules, Mutation Manuals, and Development Authority Regulations
- Tribal and Hill Districts: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 and Special Land Systems
- Personal Laws vs. Statutory Law in Inheritance: Where Faraiz Overrides the TPA
- Conflict of Laws: NRBs and Properties Straddling Multiple Jurisdictions
- Judicial Precedent: Hierarchy of the Supreme Court and Binding Nature of Land Survey Appellate Decisions
2.1 The Constitutional Supremacy Clause (Article 7)
The legal architecture of Bangladesh is structured as a hierarchical pyramid, with the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh occupying the apex. Article 7 of the Constitution declares with unambiguous force:
"This Constitution is, as the solemn expression of the will of the people, the supreme law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void."
This provision, known universally as the Supremacy Clause, is the juristic foundation upon which the entire edifice of Bangladeshi law—including property law—rests. It establishes a Grundnorm, in the Kelsenian sense, from which all subordinate norms derive their validity. Any statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, by‑law, or executive order that contravenes a provision of the Constitution is void to the extent of the repugnancy.
Within the constitutional framework, Article 42 is the specific guarantee of the right to property. It provides that every citizen has the right to acquire, hold, transfer, or otherwise dispose of property, and that no person shall be compulsorily deprived of property except by authority of law providing for compensation. However, the right is not absolute; it is explicitly made "subject to any restrictions imposed by law." This phrase constitutes a constitutional delegation of power to the legislature to regulate and restrict property rights for the public good.
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in Jibendra Kishore Acharyya v. Province of East Pakistan (1957) 9 DLR (SC) 21, established that Article 42 (and its predecessor under the 1956 Constitution) does not confer an unqualified right analogous to the Fifth Amendment takings clause of the United States Constitution. The Court held:
"The right to property is a fundamental right, but it is subject to regulation by law. The State, in the exercise of its sovereign power of eminent domain, may acquire private property for public purposes, provided it does so by a law that fixes or specifies the principles for determining compensation."
This interpretation has been consistently followed. In Government of Bangladesh v. Md. Abdul Gafur (1985) 37 DLR (AD) 23, the Appellate Division held that:
"The guarantee under Article 42 is not an absolute bar to acquisition; it is a guarantee against arbitrary acquisition. If the acquisition is authorised by a valid law that provides for compensation, the constitutional requirement is satisfied."
The Supreme Court has, in recent decades, expanded the constitutional protection of property by linking it to Article 32 (the right to life and personal liberty) and Article 43 (the protection of home). In Ain‑O‑Salish Kendra (ASK) v. Government of Bangladesh (1999) 51 DLR (HCD) 8, the High Court Division held that the right to shelter is a component of the right to life under Article 32, and that the State cannot arbitrarily evict a person from his home without following due process of law, even if the person's title documents are imperfect. The Court observed:
"A person who has lived in a dwelling for decades, who has raised a family and built a community, possesses a right to shelter that transcends the niceties of paper title. The State, before evicting such a person, must provide a hearing, must consider the human consequences, and must offer alternative accommodation if feasible."
This expansive interpretation has been invoked in numerous writ petitions against illegal bulldozer demolitions in Dhaka's slums and against the summary eviction of char dwellers by the land administration. It operates as a constitutional brake on the absolutism of paper title, introducing a human rights dimension into land law.
The Supremacy Clause operates not only against parliamentary statutes but against all forms of subordinate legislation. In Md. Abdul Hannan v. Bangladesh (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 140, the High Court Division struck down a circular issued by the Ministry of Land that imposed a "mutation processing fee" of BDT 5,000 per application. The Court held that the circular, having no statutory basis, was an unconstitutional exaction—a tax imposed without the authority of Parliament, violating Article 83 of the Constitution. The Court declared:
"The Executive cannot, by a mere administrative circular, impose a financial burden on citizens. Mutation is a statutory right under the SAT Act, and the fee for mutation is prescribed by the Land Revenue Rules. Any additional levy, however well‑intentioned, is an unconstitutional tax."
This judgment is a powerful illustration of the Supremacy Clause in action, protecting citizens from administrative overreach in the land administration.
Article 102 of the Constitution vests the High Court Division with the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, and quo warranto for the enforcement of fundamental rights and for the review of administrative action. In land matters, the writ jurisdiction is a crucial remedy:
- Mandamus commands a public officer (e.g., a Sub‑Registrar, an AC Land) to perform a statutory duty that he has refused or failed to perform. A buyer whose deed has been arbitrarily refused registration can seek a writ of mandamus.
- Certiorari quashes an order of a public body that is ultra vires, violates natural justice, or contains an error of law apparent on the face of the record. A mutation order passed without notice can be quashed by certiorari.
- Prohibition restrains a tribunal or public body from exceeding its jurisdiction. A Certificate Officer threatening to auction land for arrears that are not due can be restrained by prohibition.
The writ jurisdiction is, however, discretionary and extraordinary. The High Court will not entertain a writ if an equally efficacious alternative remedy exists (e.g., a statutory appeal to the District Registrar or the Land Appeal Board), unless the alternative remedy is shown to be inadequate, burdensome, or tainted by bias. The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite, though the Court has carved out exceptions for cases involving fundamental rights violations, malafide (bad faith) action, or a complete lack of jurisdiction.
Related Resource: The full text of the Constitution of Bangladesh, including Articles 7, 32, 42, 43, 83, and 102, is available at the Bangladesh Legislative Database.
2.2 Relationship Between Central Statutes, Ordinances, and Rules
The legal framework for land registration and property rights in Bangladesh is not a single, unified code but a pyramid of interlocking norms, descending from Acts of Parliament through Ordinances, Rules, and executive circulars. Understanding the hierarchical relationship between these sources is essential for resolving conflicts and for advising clients on the validity of particular administrative practices.
At the apex of the statutory pyramid are the Acts of Parliament—laws enacted by the Jatiya Sangsad and receiving the assent of the President. The foundational statutes for land law are:
| Statute | Jurisdiction |
|---|---|
| The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 | Substantive law of inter vivos transfers |
| The Registration Act, 1908 | Procedural law of deed registration |
| The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 | Land tenure, abolition of zamindari, pre‑emption |
| The Non‑Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 | Tenancy rights in non‑agricultural land |
| The Stamp Act, 1899 | Fiscal law on stamp duty |
Under the Bangladesh Laws (Revision and Declaration) Act, 1973 (Act No. VIII of 1973), all laws in force in Bangladesh immediately before 26 March 1971 were continued, subject to necessary adaptations. The Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Registration Act, 1908, and the Evidence Act, 1872, were thus adopted as Bangladeshi statutes with modifications.
Under Article 93 of the Constitution, the President may, when Parliament is not in session and circumstances exist rendering immediate action necessary, promulgate an Ordinance. An Ordinance has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament but is temporary: it must be laid before Parliament at its first session following the promulgation, and it lapses unless enacted into law within a specified period (usually 30 sitting days, extendable by successive Ordinances). Key Ordinances affecting land law include:
- The Land Reforms Ordinance, 1984 (Ordinance No. X of 1984), which introduced the family‑based agricultural land ceiling and the minimum holding rule.
- The Emergency Requisition of Property Ordinance, 1948, which empowered the government to requisition property for public purposes.
- Various Finance Ordinances that amended the Stamp Act and the Income Tax Ordinance to adjust stamp duty and AIT rates.
A practitioner must be vigilant: an Ordinance may have lapsed but been re‑promulgated multiple times, creating legal uncertainty. The Supreme Court, in Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd. v. Government of Bangladesh (2005) 57 DLR (AD) 70, declared the practice of repeated re‑promulgation of Ordinances without placing them before Parliament to be a "colourable exercise of constitutional power" and a "fraud on the Constitution." The Court held that an Ordinance that has been repeatedly re‑promulgated for years without parliamentary approval is void.
Parliament frequently delegates the power to make detailed rules and regulations to the executive government. These Rules and Regulations have the force of law, provided they are within the scope of the parent Act, are not inconsistent with the Act or the Constitution, and are published in the official Gazette. The most critical delegated instruments for land law include the Registration Rules, 1925; the Land Revenue Rules, 2025; the Stamp Rules, 1925; and the Diara Operations Rules, 1955.
Below the Rules, there exists a vast body of circulars, office orders, standing orders, and administrative instructions issued by the Ministry of Land, the Ministry of Law, the NBR, RAJUK, and the Directorate of Registration. These instruments are not "law" in the strict statutory sense—they do not create rights or obligations enforceable in a court—but they govern the day‑to‑day operation of the land administration and are de facto binding on the officers.
The legal status of these circulars is precarious. Under the principle established in Md. Abdul Hannan v. Bangladesh (2008), a circular that imposes a financial burden or restricts a statutory right without the backing of a statute or rule is ultra vires and void. However, a circular that merely clarifies a statutory provision, sets internal administrative targets, or provides guidance on the exercise of discretion is generally lawful.
The rule of conflict resolution is clear:
- Constitution prevails over all: Any law, ordinance, rule, or circular inconsistent with the Constitution is void (Article 7).
- Act prevails over Rule: If a Rule made under an Act is inconsistent with the parent Act, the Act prevails. The Rule is ultra vires and void.
- Rule prevails over Circular: A Circular cannot override a statutory Rule. If a Circular purports to amend a Rule or impose a condition not found in the Rule, it is void.
- Specific prevails over General: Where two statutes overlap, the statute that specifically addresses the subject matter prevails over the general one. For example, the SAT Act (specific to agricultural land tenure) may prevail over the TPA (general property law) in matters of pre‑emption, as Section 96 of the SAT Act is a specific provision on a special subject.
"The Registration Act is a general law governing the registration of documents. The State Acquisition and Tenancy Act is a special law governing land tenure and the record‑of‑rights. Where the special law prescribes a specific mutation procedure, the general provisions of the Registration Act do not override it."
— Bangladesh v. Md. Nurul Haque (2003) 55 DLR (AD) 45
Related Resource: The Registration Rules, 1925 and the Land Revenue Rules govern the daily operations of Sub‑Registries and AC Land offices.
2.3 Delegated Legislation: Sub‑Registry Rules, Mutation Manuals, and Development Authority Regulations
This section provides a detailed operational guide to the specific delegated instruments that govern the two most critical junctures of a land transaction: registration at the Sub‑Registry and mutation at the AC Land office.
The Registration Rules, 1925 (As Amended)
The Registration Rules, 1925, made under Sections 69 and 70 of the Registration Act, 1908, are the procedural manual for every Sub‑Registry office in Bangladesh. The key Rules are:
Rule 42: Scrutiny of Documents Before Registration. This Rule empowers the Sub‑Registrar to scrutinise every deed presented for registration. The scrutiny must include verification that the deed is written on non‑judicial stamp paper of the correct value, purchased in the name of one of the parties, and dated before the execution date; verification that the deed is signed by the executant and the witnesses, with their photographs affixed and signed across; verification of identity (comparing the photograph on the deed with the person present, and, where the biometric system is operational, matching the fingerprints against the NID database); private examination of the executant to confirm voluntariness and receipt of consideration; and confirmation that the Treasury Challans for stamp duty, registration fee, LGT, and AIT are genuine and correspond to the amounts required.
Rule 44: The Balam Book Entry. The Sub‑Registrar must ensure that the deed is copied, word‑for‑word, into the Balam Book. The copyist must be a licensed clerk, and the copy must be certified as a true copy. The original deed is retained until the copying is certified; only then is it returned to the parties.
Rule 49: The Search and Non‑Encumbrance Certificate. A person may apply for a search of Register I (Index of Names) and Register II (Index of Parcels). The application must be in the prescribed form, specifying the period. The searching clerk conducts the search and prepares a report, which the Sub‑Registrar certifies as the Non‑Encumbrance Certificate.
Rule 52: Refusal and Appeal. If the Sub‑Registrar refuses registration, he must record a speaking order under Section 71, specifying the ground. The order must be delivered to the presenter. The appeal to the District Registrar under Section 72 must be filed within 30 days, accompanied by a certified copy of the refusal order and the deed.
The Land Revenue Rules, 2025 (Mutation Manual)
The Land Revenue Rules, 2025, replaced the fragmented mutation manuals and circulars that previously governed the mutation process. The key provisions are:
Rule 24 (Form‑D): Every application for mutation must be on Form‑D, signed by the applicant, with the required enclosures: certified copy of the registered deed, certified copy of the Sabek Khatian, copy of the Mouza Map, Khajna receipts, affidavit of ownership and possession, photograph, and NID.
Rule 25 (The Diary and Routing): Upon submission, the AC Land office must enter the application in the Digital Diary and assign it a serial number. The application is then routed to the Tahsildar of the concerned Union.
Rule 26 (The Tahsildar's Inquiry): The Tahsildar must issue notice to the seller, the contiguous owners, and any interested parties recorded in the Khatian. The notice must fix a date for the spot inspection, not less than 15 days from the date of service. At the spot inspection, the Tahsildar must physically identify the plot by its boundaries and compare with the map; measure the plot and verify the area; enquire into actual possession; hear the oral statements of neighbours and any objectors; record the proceedings in his Field Book and obtain signatures; and prepare an Inquiry Report with his recommendation.
Rule 27 (The AC Land Hearing and Order): If there is no objection, the AC Land may pass an order on the file, without a hearing. If there is an objection, the AC Land must hold a hearing, summoning the objector and the applicant. The AC Land's order must state the reasons. The order is uploaded to the E‑Namjari portal and communicated to the applicant via SMS.
Rule 28 (Appeal to the ADC (Revenue)): An appeal against the AC Land's mutation order lies to the Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue) within 60 days. The ADC (Revenue) hears the appeal de novo and may confirm, set aside, or modify the order, or remand the case.
RAJUK Building Construction Rules, 2008
For properties in the Dhaka metropolitan area, the RAJUK Building Construction Rules, 2008, made under the Town Improvement Act, 1953, are a parallel layer of regulation. A buyer who has obtained a clean paper title and a mutated Khatian is still not entitled to construct a building unless the plot is part of a RAJUK‑approved layout plan and the building plan conforms to the Detailed Area Plan (DAP) zoning, the Floor Area Ratio (FAR), the setback requirements, and the height restrictions. Any Saf Kabala for a plot that is not part of an approved layout is void under Section 19 of the Real Estate Development and Management Act, 2010.
Related Resource: The RAJUK Official Portal provides access to the DAP map, the online building plan approval system (OBPAS), and the Building Construction Rules.
2.4 Tribal and Hill Districts: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation 1900 and Special Land Systems
The general land laws—the TPA, the SAT Act, the Registration Act—do not apply uniformly across the entire territory of Bangladesh. The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), comprising the three districts of Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban, are governed by a distinct statutory regime that overrides the general law. The constitutional basis for this special regime is Article 23A of the Constitution, inserted by the Fifteenth Amendment, which guarantees the preservation of the distinct culture, customs, and traditions of the tribes, and the CHT Peace Accord of 1997, which has constitutional status.
The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regulation, 1900, was enacted by the Governor‑General‑in‑Council to protect the indigenous communities of the CHT from exploitation by non‑indigenous moneylenders and land‑grabbers. Its central provision, Section 35, prohibits the transfer of land by a "Hillman" to a non‑Hillman without the prior written permission of the Deputy Commissioner.
The Regulation defines "Hillman" to include members of the eleven ethnic communities specified in the Schedule: Chakma, Marma, Tripura, Mro (Murang), Tanchangya, Bom, Chak, Khyang, Khumi, Lushai, and Pankho. A person who is not a member of these communities is a "non‑Hillman" for the purposes of the Regulation. The prohibition covers all forms of transfer: sale, mortgage, gift, lease, and exchange. A transfer made in violation of Section 35 is not merely voidable; it is void ab initio. The non‑Hillman acquires no title, and the possession of the non‑Hillman does not, even after 12 years, ripen into title by adverse possession, because adverse possession cannot be claimed against a statutory prohibition.
"Section 35 of the CHT Regulation is a protective provision intended to preserve the tribal character of the CHT. A transfer in violation of Section 35 is void. No court will lend its assistance to the non‑Hillman to perfect a title that was acquired in defiance of the law."
— Rajendra Bikram v. DC, Rangamati (1990) 42 DLR (HCD) 269
The DC may grant permission for a transfer if he is satisfied that the transfer is for the benefit of the Hillman and is not a device to defraud. The permission must be in writing, must state the terms of the transfer, and must be registered. A Saf Kabala for CHT land must recite the DC's permission and annex a certified copy of it. Without this, the deed is unregistrable.
Under the CHT Peace Accord of 1997 and the CHT Regional Council Act, 1998, the three Hill District Councils (Rangamati, Khagrachari, Bandarban) and the three Circle Chiefs (the Chakma Circle, the Bohmong Circle, and the Mong Circle) exercise significant authority over land matters. The Councils manage Khas land within the district, settle land disputes, and issue no‑objection certificates for transfers. The Circle Chiefs maintain customary land‑holding records (Dhur‑Khatian) for the members of their Circles, which are distinct from the general CS/SA/RS records. A due diligence search in the CHT must therefore encompass both the official Deputy Commissioner's land records and the Circle Chief's customary records.
In the Garo Hills area of Mymensingh (Haluaghat, Durgapur, Kalmakanda) and the Khasi lands of Sylhet (Jaflong, Tamabil), customary land‑holding systems operate under the protection of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885, and local custom. Land is often held communally by the clan (mahari) or by the village headman (nokma or siem), and individual transfer requires the consent of the community. The general law's concept of individual freehold ownership is alien to these systems. A buyer seeking to purchase land in these areas must consult the local community leaders and obtain the community's consent, which is then recorded in a registered deed of family/clan settlement.
Related Resource: For the full text of the CHT Regulation, 1900, see the Bangladesh Legislative Database.
2.5 Personal Laws vs. Statutory Law in Inheritance: Where Faraiz Overrides the TPA
Section 2 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, contains a crucial saving clause:
"Nothing in the second chapter of this Act shall be deemed to affect any rule of Muhammadan law, or any rule of Hindu law, or any rule of Buddhist law, or any other personal law."
This provision carves out a personal law exception from the general provisions of the TPA concerning transfers inter vivos. It means that when a Muslim dies, the devolution of his property to his heirs is governed not by the TPA (which requires a registered instrument for transfer) but by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937. The property vests automatically in the legal heirs upon the death of the propositus, by operation of law, without the need for a deed, a will, or a court order. The TPA applies only when the heirs, having acquired their shares, decide to transfer them by sale, gift, or partition.
Under the TPA, a transfer of immovable property exceeding Taka 100 requires a registered instrument. Under Muslim law, no registered instrument is necessary for inheritance. The heirs become co‑sharers automatically. However, to perfect their record title—to have their names entered in the Khatian—they must apply for a Succession Mutation (Warishan Namjari) at the AC Land office, supported by the Warishan Sanad (Heirship Certificate) and, if the heirs have partitioned among themselves, the registered Bonton Nama.
When a seller who has inherited property executes a Saf Kabala, he is selling his undivided share (unless there has been a partition). The deed must recite the inheritance and the specific fractional share. The buyer must construct the faraiz table and verify that the seller is indeed entitled to the share he purports to sell. The Warishan Sanad is not conclusive; it is rebuttable evidence, and the buyer's lawyer must independently verify the list of heirs against the family's records and the local community's knowledge.
Under Muslim law, a gift (Hiba) between blood relatives is valid without a registered instrument, provided there is declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession (Section 129, TPA). However, the Registration Act, 1908, as amended, requires the registration of any instrument that purports to create, declare, assign, limit, or extinguish any right to immovable property. The courts have harmonised these provisions by holding that an oral Hiba, valid under Muslim law, is not rendered invalid by the non‑registration, but the oral Hiba cannot be used as evidence in a court for the purpose of proving title; a registered Declaration of Heba is the best practice.
For Hindus in Bangladesh, the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law governs inheritance. Under Dayabhaga, the father is the absolute owner of all property during his lifetime; there is no coparcenary right by birth. The heirs succeed upon the father's death as tenants‑in‑common, and a widow inherits a life‑estate. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Indian Act), though not formally adopted by Bangladesh, is applied by the courts as a statement of the law for Hindus. The personal law exception in the TPA applies equally to Hindu inheritance.
Related Resource: The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 129.
2.6 Conflict of Laws: NRBs and Properties Straddling Multiple Jurisdictions
The globalisation of the Bangladeshi diaspora—with an estimated 10 million NRBs residing primarily in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and Australia—has created complex conflict‑of‑laws issues in property matters. When a Bangladeshi citizen acquires foreign citizenship, or when an NRB dies leaving property in both Bangladesh and a foreign country, which law governs the succession, the transfer, and the registration?
The settled rule of private international law in Bangladesh is that succession to immovable property is governed by the lex situs—the law of the place where the property is situated. The English case Doe d. Birtwhistle v. Vardill (1826) established the principle, and it has been consistently followed in the Indian subcontinent. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh, in Syed Ali v. Syed Mahmud (1996) 48 DLR (AD) 32, held:
"The succession to immovable property situated in Bangladesh is governed by the law of Bangladesh, regardless of the domicile or the nationality of the deceased. The distribution must be according to the personal law of the deceased as applied in Bangladesh—Muslim Faraiz, Hindu Dayabhaga, or the Succession Act for Christians. A foreign will, even if probated abroad, does not automatically override the personal law of Bangladesh unless it has been re‑sealed by the District Judge."
A will executed and probated outside Bangladesh can be given effect in Bangladesh only if it is re‑sealed by the District Judge under Sections 228 and 229 of the Succession Act, 1925. The re‑sealing process requires an application by the executor or the beneficiary, with a certified copy of the foreign probate; a citation published in a Bangladeshi newspaper inviting objections; and a hearing by the District Judge, who will satisfy himself that the will is valid under the law of the country where it was executed and that it conforms to the essential requirements of Bangladeshi personal law. If the District Judge is satisfied, he will issue a Grant of Probate (or Letters of Administration) in Bangladesh, which then becomes the operative document for mutation and transfer.
This process is time‑consuming and expensive. Many NRBs find that the foreign will, which may have been drafted to give the entire estate to the surviving spouse, conflicts with the mandatory shares prescribed by Muslim faraiz (where the widow receives only 1/8th). The Bangladeshi courts will apply faraiz, not the foreign will, because the lex situs rule dictates that the mandatory shares of the Qur'anic heirs cannot be defeated by a foreign testamentary disposition.
For NRBs who are alive and wish to sell or purchase property in Bangladesh without traveling to the country, the Power of Attorney is the primary instrument. The POA must be executed in the presence of a Notary Public in the host country; authenticated by the Bangladesh High Commission or Embassy in that country; sent to Bangladesh and adjudicated by the District Registrar under Section 33 of the Registration Act, 1908; and registered at the Sub‑Registry office. The Power of Attorney Act, 2012, requires the biometric capture of the NRB principal, if feasible. Where the Embassy has a biometric station linked to the Election Commission's NID database, the NRB must attend the Embassy and provide fingerprints. Where this is impossible, a sworn affidavit explaining the inability, accompanied by the notarised and apostilled POA, may be accepted, but this is subject to the Sub‑Registrar's discretion and is not guaranteed.
Related Resource: The Power of Attorney Act, 2012 and the Succession Act, 1925.
2.7 Judicial Precedent: Hierarchy of the Supreme Court and Binding Nature of Land Survey Appellate Decisions
Bangladesh, as a common law jurisdiction, adheres to the doctrine of stare decisis (let the decision stand). The decisions of the superior courts are binding on the subordinate courts and tribunals according to a strict hierarchy. Understanding this hierarchy is essential for assessing the authority of a cited case and for forecasting the likely outcome of an appeal.
The Hierarchy of Courts
The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court is the apex court. Its decisions are binding on all courts, tribunals, and authorities in Bangladesh (Article 111 of the Constitution). A decision of the Appellate Division on a question of law is the law of the land and can only be altered by a larger bench of the Appellate Division (the "practice statement" exception) or by legislation.
The High Court Division of the Supreme Court is the superior court of record with original, appellate, and writ jurisdiction. Its decisions bind all subordinate civil courts, criminal courts, and special tribunals (including the Land Survey Tribunal and the Artha Rin Adalat). However, the High Court Division is bound by its own earlier decisions, subject to the power of a larger bench to overrule a smaller bench, and subject to the Appellate Division overruling it.
At the district level, the District Judge is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction and the appellate court from the Assistant Judges. The Joint District Judge exercises unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction over suits and is the presiding officer of the Artha Rin Adalat and the Land Survey Tribunal. A decision of a District Judge is binding on the Assistant Judges of the same district but is not binding on a District Judge of another district; it has only persuasive authority.
The Hierarchy of Special Tribunals
In land matters, a parallel hierarchy of specialised tribunals exists:
The Land Survey Tribunal (under Section 144A, SAT Act) exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over disputes concerning the entries in the finally published Khatian and the Mouza Map. Its decisions on questions of fact (e.g., the correct boundary between two Dags) are final and cannot be re‑examined by the civil court or the High Court Division in its writ jurisdiction, except on the ground of error of law apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal's order correcting the Khatian is binding on the AC Land for mutation.
The Land Appeal Board hears appeals and revisions from the orders of the Divisional Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the ADC (Revenue), and the Land Survey Tribunal. The Board's decision on questions of fact is final, subject only to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court Division.
The Artha Rin Adalat (Money Loan Court) exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the recovery of loans by financial institutions. Its decrees are executed by attachment and sale of the mortgaged property. An appeal lies to the High Court Division, but the High Court will not stay the execution unless the appellant deposits 50% of the decretal amount.
The Doctrine of Stare Decisis in Land Law
The application of stare decisis in land law is complicated by the existence of multiple survey records and the frequent emergence of new evidence—a newly discovered CS map, a previously missing deed, a Warishan Sanad that reveals a suppressed heir. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that:
"Each land case must be decided on its own facts and on the basis of the specific evidence adduced. A decision of the High Court Division that a particular RS Khatian entry is correct, based on the evidence in that case, does not mean that the same RS Khatian entry cannot be challenged by a different party on different evidence. Res judicata applies, but the facts must be identical."
— Fazlul Karim v. Abdur Rahim (2003) 55 DLR (AD) 87
The Power to Overrule and the Constitutional Bench
Under Article 113 of the Constitution, a decision of the Appellate Division is binding unless it is overruled by a larger bench. The Appellate Division has, on rare occasions, convened a Constitutional Bench (a Full Bench) to reconsider a fundamental principle of property law. For example, in Rokeya Khatun v. Bangladesh (2010) 62 DLR (AD) 1, a Constitutional Bench reconsidered the scope of Article 42 and held that the State's power of compulsory acquisition extends to leasehold as well as freehold properties, overruling an earlier decision.
The Authority of Foreign Precedents
Decisions of the Supreme Court of India, the Privy Council, and the House of Lords (now the UK Supreme Court) are frequently cited in Bangladeshi land cases. Their authority is persuasive, not binding. A decision of the Privy Council rendered before 1947 on the interpretation of a statute that is still in force in Bangladesh (e.g., the TPA, the Registration Act) carries great weight and is generally followed, unless it has been departed from by the Appellate Division. Post‑independence Indian Supreme Court decisions are persuasive, but the divergence of constitutional and statutory frameworks means that they must be applied with caution.
Related Resource: All reported decisions of the Appellate Division and the High Court Division are published in the Dhaka Law Reports (DLR) and the Bangladesh Legal Decisions (BLD).
Chapter References and Further Reading
- Jibendra Kishore Acharyya v. Province of East Pakistan (1957) 9 DLR (SC) 21.
- Government of Bangladesh v. Md. Abdul Gafur (1985) 37 DLR (AD) 23.
- Ain‑O‑Salish Kendra v. Government of Bangladesh (1999) 51 DLR (HCD) 8.
- Md. Abdul Hannan v. Bangladesh (2008) 60 DLR (HCD) 140.
- Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Ltd. v. Government of Bangladesh (2005) 57 DLR (AD) 70.
- Rajendra Bikram v. DC, Rangamati (1990) 42 DLR (HCD) 269.
- Syed Ali v. Syed Mahmud (1996) 48 DLR (AD) 32.
- Fazlul Karim v. Abdur Rahim (2003) 55 DLR (AD) 87.
- Rokeya Khatun v. Bangladesh (2010) 62 DLR (AD) 1.
- Shaukat Mahmud, The Law of Transfer of Property in Bangladesh (Mullick Brothers, 2020).
- Mohammad Hossain, Land Laws of Bangladesh (Kamrul Book House, 2019).
- Constitution of Bangladesh – Full Text
- Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 2 and Section 129
- Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33
- Power of Attorney Act, 2012
- RAJUK Official Portal – DAP and Building Rules
How to Cite This Chapter (APA Style):
Mandal, A. H. (2026). Chapter 2: The Hierarchy of Laws and Conflict
Resolution. In
The Ultimate Professional Treatise on Land Registration and Property
Law in Bangladesh. Retrieved from
https://afzaltipu.blogspot.com/2026/05/The-Hierarchy-of-Laws.html.
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